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More administrative simplicity (making avoidance and evasion
difficult) and horizontal equity (uniformly imposed across units
at the same income level) are strong selling points for tax reform.
Harder to sell are  more economic efficiency (not well understood
by the public) and vertical equity (a matter of personal judg-
ment).
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Thirsk identifies general lessons about tax  investment of mo&e  resources in training and in
reform, drawing on ten developing countries'  upgrading administrative performance.
experience:  Columbia, Indonesia, Jamaica,  *  Attention to revenue adequacy and to how
Korea, Mexico, and Turkey (which have carried  different components of tl.  tax system interact.
out comprehensive tax reforms) and Bolivia,  *  Direct targeting of tax measures mainly, if
Malawi, Morocco, and Zimbabwe (which are  not exclusively, to their intended objectives.
currently reforming their tax systems).  *  Emphasis on the importance of horizontal
Research for each country study focused on  equity, neutrality, and simplicity.
which policies and procedures worked reason-  *  Recognition that accepting crude justice in
ably well (or didn't),  using four standard public  taxation is better than fine-tuning in the search
rinance criteria:  revenue adequacy, allocative  for the unattainable goal of perfect justice.
neutrality, equity, and the efficiency of tax  Successful tax reforms share common
administration.  structural elements. For indirect taxes, countries
The goals of tax reform are more modest but  often use value-added tax to replace a hodge-
realistic than they once were.  Simpler tax rules  podge of commodity taxes, thus producing more
ignore the fine distinctions that equity demands  revenues and fewer disincentives for exports and
but serve the broader interest of tax equity by  investment. Typically, foodstuffs are exempted
encouraging fuller compliance with tax laws and  to protect the poor, excise taxes are redesigned to
making their evasion more difficult. Less  fall more heavily on luxury items, and trade and
cmphasis is placed on redistributing welfare  domestic taxes are better coordinated.
through the tax system and more on achieving  Personal and corporate income taxes are
the goals of revenue adequacy, economic neu-  typically modified so lower tax rates are applied
trality, and simplifying the tax system to make it  on a broader base. Pcrsonal income taxes are
conform to administrative capabilities.  cxpanded so that fringe benefits are more hcavily
Common elements in successful tax reform  taxed, deductions and exemptions are consoli-
include:  dated, and more use is made of presumptive
* A clear perception of the flaws in tax  levies for certain hard-to-tax groups.  No trend is
systems before reform and a well-thought-out  discemible toward replacing income taxes with
program of action to correct them.  cash-flow or expenditure-related taxes.
* The support of major policymakers and  To curb corporate tax evasion and achieve
technocrats.  more uniform tax burdens, some countries
* Careful, systematic implementation and  employ minimum taxes on a company's net
monitoring.  worth.
* Minimal usc of tax incentives and more  Many clements of capital income escape
reliance on broader, simpler tax bases on which  taxation altogether or are only partly captured in
lowcr marginal rates are imposed.  the tax base. Few countries successfully tax
* Efforts not only to avoid raising taxes on the  capital gains, for example.  And interest incomc
poor but to reduce their tax burden.  is often exempted or taxed at a low rate out of
* Avoidance of procedural demands that  concem for capital flight.
overwhelm tax administration capabilities, and
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Summarv
A World Bank research  project,  initiated  in early  1988,  examined
the  experience  with tax  reforms  in ten  developing  countries  with a view to
drawing lessons that may be useful for other countries contemplating
similar reforms.  The  countries included in this study are Turkey,
Indonesia,  Korea,  Bolivia,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Jamaica,  Morocco,  Malawi  and
Zimbabwe.  These can be separated  into two distinct  types of tax reform
experience. Colombia,  Indonesia,  Mexico,  Jamaica,  Korea and Turkey  have
all carried  out at least  one comprehensive  tax :eform  and each has been
analyzed  more extensively  than countries  found  in the second  group.  That
group, including Morocco, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Bolivia, consists of
countries  currently  in  the  process  of reforming  their  tax  systems. Because
their  experience  is so recent,  greater  weight  must necessarily  be given  to
ex ante  rather  than  to ex  post  judgements  in  assessing  their  efforts.
For  both groups,  attention  was focused  on the impetus  for  reform,
how it was accomplished,  and its substance.  In each country  study,  the
same  basic  set  of questions  was addressed  with the  goal  of gaining  a better
appreciation  of the  tax  policies  and  procedures  that  have  worked  reasonably
well in these  countries  plus,  those  that  have been less  successful. Each
study used the standard  public finance criteria of revenue adequacy,
allocative  neutrality,  equity  and the efficiency  of tax administration  in
evaluating  the  merits  of  a tax  reform  episode. Since  there  is  no consensus
on an "ideal"  profile  of a developing  country  tax  system,  especially  when
tradeoffs  among  objectives  are required,  reforms  were judged  according  to- ii  -
their ability to  e..der  improvements along each of these four dimensions.
So)me reforms  seem  capable  of  delivering  simultansous  gains  in  each
dimension,  such  as  the  replacement  of  turnover  sales  taxes  with  a
comprehensive  single  rate value-added  tax, while  others  offer a  choice
among competing tax policy objectives.  Korea, for example, has relied on a
combination of consumption taxes and savings and investment incentives to
promote higher rates of economic growth at the expet.se  of equity.  Colombia
and Mexico, on the other hand, have decided that an indexed tax system is
worth  the  extra  administrative  complexity  in light of  the benefits  of
greater neutrality and enhanced  vertical and horizontal equity.
Most of these countries have faced a common set of fiscal problems
including,  but  not  necessarily  limited to,  persistent  fiscal deficits,
bouts  of  high  inflation,  excessive  reliance  on  trade  taxes  and  tax
incentives, partial coverage of income taxes, difficulties in reaching and
consistently taxing capital incomes, the need to streamline the system of
indirect taxes, the coordination of trade and domestic indirect taxes, weak
tax administration, and widespread tax avoidance or evasion.  A number of
important lessons can be  drawn from their efforts to grapple with  these
issues.  They are discussed in some detail in the papet under the headings
of the process and substance of tax reform.  Here a composite and stylized
depiction of successful reform measures is given.
Successful tax reforms have a number of common elements: they have
a clear perception of the problems that perplex the pre-reform tax system
and a well thought out program of action; they enjoy the support of major
policymakers  and  technocrats;  they  are  carefully  and  systematically- iii  -
implemented and monitored; they eschew the profligate use of tax incentives
and instead aim for broader and simpler tax bases on which  lower marginal
rates ar  imposed; they not only avoid raising taxes on the poor but make
some effort to reduce tax burdens on this group;  they refrain from making
procedural  demands  which  overwhelm  tax  administration capacities while
investing  more  resources  in  training  and  .'.n  upgrading  the  level  of
administrative  performance;  they  pay  attention  to  interactions  among
different components of the tax system and do not neglect the importance Df
revenue adequacy; they rely primarily, if not exclusively, on tax measures
which  are directly targeted to the objectives which they are intended to
achieve; they emphasize the importance of horizontal equity, neutrality,
and simplicity, and they recognize that accepting a state of crude justice
in  taxation  and  avoiding  fine-tuning  is  better  than  seeking  some
unattainable goal of perfect justice.
Successful tax reforms also share a number of common structural
elements.  In the indirect tax area, countries have frequently turned to
the  value  added  tax  to  replace  a  hodge-podge  of  commodity  taxes  on
relatively small bases and have enjoyed g-eater total revenues and fewer
disincentives  for  exports  and  investment  as  a  result.  Typically,
exemption6 for basic foodstuffs have been provided in an effort to reduce
indirect  tax  burdens  for  the  poor.  In  order  to  obtain  even  greater
progressivity in the distribution of indirect tax burdens, many countries
have also redesigned their excise taxes so that they fall more heavily on
items  of  luxury  consumption.  Coordination  between  trade and domestit
indirect taxes has also been improved.  In the income tax area, both the- iv  -
personal  and corporate  income  taxes  have typically  been modified  so that
lower  ax ratee  a  applied  io significantly  broader  bases.  The personal
income tax base has been expanded in a variety of ways including  the
heavier  taxation  of fringe  benefits,  the consolidation  of deductions  and
exemptions and greater reliance on the use of presumptive levies for
certain  hard  to tax  groups  in  the  economy.
Despite  these  efforts  at enlarging  the  size  of the  personal  income
base  many elements  of capital  income  havi  either  escaped  altogether  or are
only partially captured in the base.  Few countries  nave successfully
managed to tax capital gains.  Interest  income  is frequently  exempted
because  of concern  over capital  flight  and  when such income  is  ubject  to
tax it is often  at relatively  low  withholding  rates.  These  holes in the
tax net have induced  many countries  to eliminate  the double taxation  of
dividends  by exempting  dividends  at the  personal  level. In  many countries
the corporate  and top  marginal  personal  income  tax rates also have been
unified,  a step  which has assisted  the  effective  integration  or these  two
income  taxes  and has eased the burden  of administering  both taxes.  The
impact  of integration  in  moderating  the incentive  of firms  to rely  on debt
finance  has been reinforced  in several  countries  by the indexed  treatment
of interest  income  that taxes  only the real component  of that income  and
permits only the  real component of interest expense to be deducted.
Typically,  indexation  has been extended  to other  parts of the income  tax
system  that  are  sensitive  to inflation.
Most countries  have also significantly  scaled  back their  use  of
investment  and other tax incentives  while at the same time reducing  the
nominal  corporate  tax rate.  In order to curb corporate  tax evasion  and- v  -
achieve a mor3 uniform pattern of inter-firm  and  inter-sectoral  tax
burdens, a number of countries have begun to employ minimum taxes on
company's  net  wcoth.  Moreover,  most tax  reforms  have been accompanied  by
substantial  improvements  in all facets  of tax administration. This has
involved  more extensive  reliance  on  withholding  mechanisms,  the  use of the
banking system to collect and to some extent  process tax payments,  the
concentration  of audit resources  on the country's  latgest  taxpayers,  and
the use of computers  to assist  in the processing  of tax returns  and tha
registration  of taxpayers.
As a result  of these  developments,  there  is  now  much  less  emphasis
placed  on achieving  a redistribution  of  welfare  through  the  tax  systc-m  and
a correspondingly  greater emphasis on achieving the goals of revenue
adequacy,  economic  neutrality,  and simplifying  the tax system  in order  to
make it conform  with current  administrative  capabilities. Consequently,
the  goals  of tax  reform  are  now  more  modest  but  perhaps  also  more realistic
than  they  were previously. The  tax  system  may  work much  better  if the  aim
is to achieve a measure of rough justice rather than E  ideal but
administratively  hopeless  objective.  Simpler  rules may ignore  the fine
distinction  that some  equity  considerations  demand  hut they  also serve  the
broadet  interest  of tax equity  by encouraging  better  compliance  with tax
laws and making evasion of those laws more difficult.  Finally,  it is
impossible  to discern  any trend towards  the replacement  of income  taxes
with cash flow or expenditure  related  taxes.  Most countries  continue  to
operate  with a hybrid  system  of income  and  consumption  based  taxes.- vi  -
It  is fitting to conclude with  the caveat th.t extreme caution
should be exercised in transferring solutions to particular tax problems
across  different  countries.  Inter-country variations  in  admini3trative
skills, in initial economic conditions, and in behavior all suggest the
need to prescribe tax remedies that are appropriate to the patient's ills.
In surveyin3 the experience of different countries there are still some tax
reform issues which  remain largely unresolved such as how best to  treat
inter,st income and expense,  whether good tax incentives  exist, and  whether
to applv the value-added  tax at the manufacturers,  wholesale,  or retail
level,  or, alternatively,  use business  size rather  than sector/stage  in
determining  coverage.LESSONS  FROM  TAX  REFORMs AN OVERVIEW
The  World  Bank's  Tax  Reform  Project  la an attsiipt  to document  and
analyze the  experience  with tax reform  in ten developing  countries. 'he
purpose  of this  project  has  been to  try  and  obtai.:  a better  appreciation  of
how developing  countries  may improve  the  performance  of their  tax  systems.
Towards  this  end,  each  country  study  has  delved  into  the  questions  of  what
motivated  these tax reforms,  what they were intended  to accomplish,  how
they  were implemented  and  how successful  they  have  been in achieving  their
objectives.  The basic thrust  of this paper is inductive;  that is, it
attempts  to discern  empirical  regularities  and see  whether  there  are some
general  lessons  that  can be extracted  from a comparison  of the experience
with tax  reform  in different  countries.
The countries  encompassed  by this project  are Turkey,  Indonesia,
Korea, Bolivia,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Jamaica,  Morocco,  Malawi  and Zimbabwe.
All of these  countries  have  undertaken  a significant  tax  reform  within  the
last zwo decades.  They can be  divided into two different groups.
Colombia,  Indonesia,  Mexico, Jamaica,  Korea and Turkey are distinguished
from the others  by the fact that they  have completed  at least  one fairly
recent major reform  whose effects  can be cbserved  and analyzed.  More
resources  have  been  committed  to studying  tile  effects  of tax  reform  in  this
group  than in the other  group  of countries. The second  group,  including
Morocco, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Bolivia, consists of countries  that are
currently  in  the  process  of reforming  their  tax  systems. Within  the  latter
group,  Bolivia  has made more progress  than the others  in laying  down the
foundations  of a new  tax  system  but  important  administrative  reforms  remain
unfinished  in that country.  Due to the contemporary  nature  of this tax- 2 -
reform  experience,  the evaluation  of speecific  reforms in these  courtries
rests  more heavily  upon anticipated  or prospective  outcomes  of the reform
process.  Consequently,  the results  of these  reforms  are necessarily  more
tentative  than  in the  other  cases  that  have  been  considered.
Each country  study  attempts  to set out the motivations  for tax
reform,  to describe  the  manner  in  which  they  were implemented  and to offer
an assessment  of how successful  different  tax  policie-  and  procedures  nave
been.  In appraising  the outcome  cf the  various  reforms,  each study has
adopted the  traditional  public finance criteria of revenue adequacy,
allocative neutrality, taxpayer equity and administrative  cepability.
Almost  all  of the  reforms  were judged  according  to their  ability  to produce
improvements  along  these  four  dimensions  of  economlc  performance.
Seen as a whole,  the  collection  of tax  reform  experiences  in this
project reveals a number of striking  similarities  in the problems  that
beset the tax and revenue  systems  of these  countrios. Moreover,  most of
these  countries  have  exhibited  a surprisingly  uniform  response  in grappling
with these problems.  This makes it possible  to draw up some general
lessons about both the process and the substance of tax reform in
developing  countries. These lessons  appear  in the final  section  of this
papez.  First, however, there is a brief introduction  of the recent
literature  on tax  reform  which is relevant  for  developing  countries. Then
the  major fiscal  issues  that have surfaced  in most of th3 countries  are
examined. That is followed  by a discussion  of some  of the  common  responses
to these  problems  that were found  in the project's  sample  of tax reform
experience. The lessons  of expe:ience  follow  immediately  afterwards. It
should  be noted  at the  outset  that  this  paper is  an overview  rather  than  a- ;  -
summary  of the ctuntry  studies  and, in l1eu  of having  read the individual
study,  at least  some of the clnims  must be accepted  on faith.  Moreovcr,
the range  of broad  generalization  is almost  always  restricted  to the ten
countries  included  in  the  project.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Only a relatively  modest  literature  exists  on the subject  of tax
reform  in developing  countries. Much of that literature  is descriptive  in
its  approach  and  typically  refrains  from  asking  whether  alternative  policy
meesures  might  have been  more successful  than the ones  that  were actually
chosen. Fu.ther,  as Gillis  (1988)  has  noted,  even  the  measurement  criteria
by which the success  or failure  of a tax refcrm  are to be judged  are  not
well established.  In his own appraisal of developing country reform
efforts,  Gillis (1988)  h.s evaluated  the merits  of a reform  according  to
whether  or  not the  announced  goals  of the  reform  have  been  met.
Newbery and Stern (1986),  on the other  hand, have attemptod  to
immerse  tax reform  in the normative  framework  provided  by the theory  of
optimal  taxation. This  theory  attempts  to account  for  the  impact  of a tax
reform  on the goals  of minimizing  tax induced  losses  in the  efficiency  of
resource  allocation  and of respecting  vertical  equity  norms.  The former
dimension  of a reform  is  captured  by the  responsiveness  of taxpayers  to tax
induced relative rrice changes  while the latter  relies  upon particular
specifications  of a social  welfare function. Optimal  tax reforms  in this
context  tend  to be those  which  settle  on a configuration  of tax  rates  thatminimize  the  efficiency  costs  (excess  burden)  of taxation  and  pay  some  heed
co society's revealed aversion to income inequality.  An interesting
feature  of these  reforms  is that  they  hardly  ever  eaLdorse  a uniform  pattern
of tax  rates.
While  optimal taration has been erected upon  an impressive
theoretical  edifice,  its  operational  content  has been callei  into  question
by many tax practitioners.  As Deaton (1986) and McLure (1989) have
*mphasized, the  infor-ation requirements of optimal tax reform are
sufficiently  dauntinq'  to the point of being almost  overwhelming. In no
country, but least of all in the case of developir.g  countries,  is it
possible  to obtain  robust  price  elasticity  estimates  for  a complete  system
of consumer demands.  Moreover,  very  little  is known about the exact
nature  of the  social  welfare  function  --  even  its  existence  has  been  called
into doubt by public  choice  theorists  --  and the suspicion  lingers  that
specific  optimal  tax proposals  may be highly  sensitive  to the particular
choice  of that  function's  key  parameters.l/
A further  limitation  of the optimal  tax  approach,  as pointed  out
recently  by  Slemrod  (1990), is that it neglects entirely the tax
administration  component  of  tax  reform  by  assuming  perfect  tax
administration,  analogous  to the  physicist's  simplifying  assumptions  of a
frictionless  world.  Once the task of implementing  a  tax reform and
enforcing  the collection  of taxes  is recognized,  the appeal  of a highly
differentiated  structure  of tax rates,  one  that  would  seriously  complicate
the ability  to administer  taxes effectively,  is considerably  diminished.
In a more realistic policy framework in which the resource costs of
implementing  tax measures  is admitted,  the proper  focus  of attention,  as
urged  by Slemrod  (1990),  is  not  optimal  taxes  but  optimal  tax  systems.2/Despite the flirtation  with the undeniable  logic of optimal  tax
theory,  the  'perative  guideline  of many  recent  tax  reforms  has  been  broader
based taxation  at more uniform  rates  which is in direct  violation  of the
dictates  of optimal  taxation.  In a sense,  the ostensible  clash  between
theory  and practice  is more apparent  than  real.  Unlike  earlier  pleas for
broader  based  taxation  that  were aimed  at achieving  greater  progressivity,
those who are recommending  broader  based taxes seek lower  marginal tax
rates and reductions in the level of tax induced  distortions  that are
prompted  by high rates. In this  manner,  the lessons  of optimal  tax  theory
have infused recent tax reform efforts with a new  respect for  the
importance  of enhanced  economic  efficiency. Perhaps  the  major difference
between optimal and uniform taxation is not the primacy of achieving
economic  efficiency  in  taxation  but  rather  with the  way in  which it can  be
accomplished. Proponents  of optimal  taxation  aspire  to attain  the most
efficient  tax structure  while advocates  of uniform  taxation  have embraced
the  more limited  objective  of securing  improvements  in the efficiency  of
taxation.
From a wider political economy perspective,  Aaron  (1989)  has
recently  spelled  out  two  basic  requirements  for  sound  tax  reform  proposals.
Analogous  to the physician's  creed  of "do  no harm",  it is imperative  for
tax reformers  to be sure  that they  "have  got their  signs  right". On this
ground  alone,  uniform  taxation  is a  much  more  attractive  principle  than  the
uncertain  and computationally  difficult  dictates  of optimal tax  theory.
Uniform  taxation  usually  promises  to deliver  efficiency  gains  even though
it may fall short, in some unknown  way, of the goal of minimizing  tax
induced  efficiency  losses. Also, it is equally  important  to advance  tax
reform  proposals  that  are  politically  robust  and  that  will  not  become  badly- 6 -
warped  when they  are  refracted  through  the  political  prism. On this  ground
as well, uniform taxation  that is directly  opposed  to preferential  tax
treatments seems likely to deliver a better outcome than the highly
differentiated  approach  favored  by optimal  tax  theory.
If there  is  now  a growing  consensus  on the  desirability  of uniform
taxation  as the  appropriate  tax  reform  target,  there  is also an increasing
recognition  of the  high degree  of complementarity  that exists  between  the
efficiency  payoff  of uniform  taxation  and the other tax reform  goals of
horizontal  equity  and  greater  simplicity.  If tax  bases  are  broader  and  tax
rates are lower and more uniform, there is a greater likelihood  that
households  in the same  economic  circumstances  prior  to the application  of
taxes  will continue  to resemble  each other  after  taxes  have been applied.
Lower tax rates reduce the rewards for rent seeking,  evasion and tax
incentive relief, thereby improving the odds that equals are treated
equally. Moreover,  if differential  tax  treatment  is ruled  out and  various
distinctions  among taxpayers  and different  sources  of income  are swept
aside,  it is possible  to simplify  and streamline  the operation  of the tax
system.  Thus tax reform  proposals  in a number of countries  stress  the
basic harmony that exists  among the objectives  of economic  neutrality,
horizontal  equity  and  tax  simplification.
II.  THE  HAIN  CONCERNS  OF  TAX  POLICY
Although  tax  reforms  in  the  various  countries  have  typically  dealt
with a diverse  set of issues,  there is still  a universal  core of fiscal
problems  that  runs  through  the  entire  collection  of tax  reform  experiences.
A brief discussion  of these  problems  helps to make clear  what successful
tax  reforms  must  accomplish.- 7-
A.  The Quest 'or  Better  Indirect Taxes
With  the  single  exception  of  Zimbabwe,  all  of  the  countries
included in the tax reform project have recently adopted the value added
form  of  sales  tax.  Behind  this  development  has  been  increasing
disenchantment  with  the  haphazard  effects  of  turnover  taxes  on  the
treatment  of  investment  and  tradeable  goods,  as  well  as  some
dissatisfaction with  the  random incidence pattern  associated with  these
taxes.  Adoption of the VAT has been viewed as a reasonably reliable  method
of  promoting  both  exports  and  investment  while  achieving  a  more
predictable, and often  more equitable,  distribution of tax burdens.3/
Often the VAT has been seen as a panacea for a wide variety of
fiscal  ills  including  the need  for higher revenue.  The  large revenue
potential of  the  VAT has made  it the marginal  source of  funds in many
countries and has  shifted the mix of taxation away from income and more
towards  consumer  expenditure.  Experience  in  a  couple  of  countries,
however, tempars this enthusiasm by illustrating  what can happen if a VAT
is poorly  designed.  If the preparation  for the VAT  is  inadequate and
enforcement is  weak  (as it was in Bolivia  when the tax was first attempted
there  in  1975)  or  if  the  VAT  has  numerous  rates  and  is  riddled with
extensive exemptions (as in Morocco), it may operate with the same defects
and, indeed,  may be even  worse than the indirect taxes that it  replaced.
In undertaking a reform of their indirect taxes, most countries
have attempted to coordinate the operation of their trade taxes with their
domestic indirect taxes.4/  Nonetheless, very few countries have tackled
tariff reform simultaneously  with indirect tax reform.  In large part, this
is  because  it often proved  impossible to  get trade  taxes on  the  table
during  the  fiscal  reform  discussions.  Perhaps  because  of  its  closerelationship  with the  World  Bank,  Malawi  alone  has  managed  to overcome  this
restriction  on the  scope  of indirect  tax  reform.  From the  very beginning
of the reform  initiative  in Malawi,  concerted  efforts  were made to adjust
both indirect  taxes  and  tariffs  and  to apply  them  with less  discrimination
in favcr of domestic  over foreign  sources  of supply.  It is true that
Bolivia  reformed  its tariffs  at the  same time  as its  tax system  but these
activities  were separate  parts of a general  restructuring  rather  than a
deliberate  attempt  to integrate  trade  and  domestic  taxation.
In this area,  however,  as in all  other  areas  of tax  policy,  it is
important  to  have  a broad  perspective  on the  impact  of tax  reform  proposals
as a recent  experience  in Zaire  indicates. Although  it  was not a part of
the  tax  reform  sample,  the  case  of indirect  tax  reform  in  Zaire  illustrates
the dangers  of relying  on a narrow  trade  focus  for  achieving  indirect  tax
reform.  Prior to the reform  activity,  Zaire operated  a sales te&x  that
effectively  rebated  the  tax  imposed  on the  purchase  of  business  inputd. At
the same time,  tariffs  were significantly  higher  on final  couaffumer  goods
than  on intermediate  inputs  and  capital  goode. In  ordar  to clintinate  large
variations  in effective  rates  of protection,  it  was recommer.ded  that  Zaire
move towards  a  uniform  tariff  structure  by imposing  substantiallvr  higher
tariff  rates  on both intermediate  inputs  and capital  goods.  To forestall
undesirable  import  substitution  in these  latter  two  activities,  it  was also
recommended  that import  cowpeting  production  of intermediate  inputs  and
capital  goods  be taxed  at equivalent  rates. The  net effect  of this  series
of recommendations  would have  been to introduce  a turnover  tax and  all of
its  undesirable  consequences  into  Zaire  through  the  back  door.
Fortunately,  none  of these  compromising  measures  was ever  adopted  in  Zaire.- 9  -
B.  The  Relatively  Small  Size  of  the  Income  Tax  Base
There  are  several  reasons  why it is  difficult  to  broaden  the  bases
of the personal  and corporate  income  taxes in developing  countries.  In
addition  to the intractable  measurement  problems  posed by capital  gains,
imputed  housing  rents  and fringe  benefits,  there  are  political  preferences
accorded to certain sectors, such as the favored status accorded to
agriculture in Colombia, Turkey and Morocco, plus widely recognized
weaknesses in tax administration.  The presence of a large number of
workers  employed  in  small  businesses,  in  urban  professional  occupations  and
in the agricultural  sector  poses  a serious  challenge  to the capability  of
tax administrations  properly  to assess  and collect income  taxes in most
developing  countries.
A number  of countries,  including  Turkey,  Bolivia,  Colombia,  Mexico
and Korea  have attempted  to apply  various  forms  of presumptive  taxation  in
an effort  to include  these  groups  in the income  tax base.  In principle,
these measures  should expand the size of the tax base, raise total
revenues,  improve  both horizontal  and  vertical  equity  and  produce  gains  in
economic neutrality.  In practice, however, efforts at introdue:tng
presumptive  taxation  may take the form of special  tax regimes  that have
just the opposite effect.  While special tax regimes may  incorporate
additional taxpayers into the tax base, they may also create  new tax
evasion opportunities  for other taxpayers  who may  be induced to seek
reclassification  as members of the hard to tax group or who may try to
shelter their taxable  income  in more lightly  taxed activities.  Mexico
offers  some  interesting  examples  of these  revenue  reducing  tendencies. To
include  trucking  services  in  the  overall  tax  base,  Mexico  used to tax  this
activity  on a per unit basis.  As a result,  many companies  used transfer- 10  -
pricing techniques  to channel  their taxable income  into this fixed tax
category.  Mexico also tried to encompass  construction  activity  in the
overall tax base by levying  a three percent  tax cn gross construction
receipts.  Many companies responded to the disparity  between this tax
treatment and the standard  treatment  under the corporate  income  tax by
issuing false invoices to corporations and enabling them to achieve
significant  reductions  in  their  taxable  income  and  corporate  tax
liabilities.
C.  CaDital  Income:  SliRving  Through  the  Tax  Net
Just as some activities  are not easily  brought  into the tax  ret,
some  sources  of income  are  much  harder  to tax  than  others. In a number  of
countries,  the personal  income  tax is little  more than a burden  on labor
incomes  earned  in the modern  sectors of the economy.  Reaching a
significant  share of capital  incomes  through  either  the personal  or the
corporate  income  tax  poses  a serious  problem  for  most developing  countries.
In Korea,  for  example,  slightly  less  than  a third  of the  economy's  capital
income  is included  in the base of the personal  income  tax compared  to an
inclusion  rate of about 75 percent for labor income.  Similar  kinds of
differential  coverage  were also  found  in Bolivia,  prio-  to its  tax  reform,
and  in  Morocco.
Part cf the  problem  springs  from the  global  mobility  of capital,
financial  capital  in particular. Fear  of capital  flight  and the  inability
to tax  residents'  worldwide  income  have  persuaded  a number  of countries  to
exempt  interest  income  from  the  personal  income  tax and  to tolerate,  as in
the case of Colombia  and Korea,  the existence  of no-name  bearer shares.
Indonesia,  for instance,  made no serious  effort until very recently  to- 11  -
include  interest  income  in the  personal  income  tax  because  such  income  goes
untaxed  in  nearby  Singapore. More  generally,  foreign  tax  systems  seriously
constrain the tax options of developing  countries  and nowhere is this
better  illustrated  than  in the  recent  decision  by the  United  States  not to
tax  the  U.S.  source  interest  income  of foreigners.
As the study  of Mexico  suggests,  attempts  to tax interest  income
may  only result in higher interest rates in the economy if domestic
investors are able to reallocate  their portfolios  towards  more lightly
taxed assets elsewhere in the world.  Higher interest  rates will also
reduce  the size of the corporate  income  tax  base and add to the cost of
servicing  public  debt on the expenditure  side of the budget.5/  On the
other  hand, failure  to tax interest  income  while letting  companies  deduct
interest  expense  offers  significant  opportunities  for tax arbitrage. So-
called  back to back loans  or the practice  of "round  tripping"  as it is
referred  to in Indonesia,  in which companies  obtain interest  deductible
bank loans in exchange  for  making  bank deposits,  (which  was found to be
fairly  common  in  Indonesia,  Mexico  and  Jamaica)  provide  useful
demonstrations  of the ease with which tax exemptions  can swing open the
door  for  widespread  tax  evasion.
In countries  where there is zero or low taxation  of interest
income at the personal  level  while cnly equity  income is taxed at the
corporate  level,  sizeable  financial  distortions  have been created  because
companies  have been encouraged  to put excessive  reliance  on debt.  Many
countries  have attempted  to offset  this debt  bias either  by imposing  thin
capitalization  rules,  as in Korea  and Indonesia,  or, as also in  Korea,  by
reducing  the rate of taxation  on dividend  income.  This bias has been
further  reduced  by the  inability  to tax  stock  market  related  capital  gains- 12 -
and the  exclusion  of  dividends  from  the  personal  tax  base  in  countries  such
as Colombia,  Mexico and Indonesia. Perhaps  only Zimbabwe  har managed  to
tax  most interest  incomes  successfully  but  Zimbabwe's  situation  ie special
as capital markets are  tightly controlled in that country.  Other
countries,  such  as  Turkey  and  Korea,  have  turned  to  a schedular  approach  in
taxing  interest  income  in  which a modest  amount  of tax is withheld  at the
source.
D.  The  Pursuit  of Non-Revenue  Obiectives:  The  Problematic  Impact  of
Tax  Incentives
Further undermining  the revenue potential  of taxes on capital
income  has been the propensity  of many, if  not most,  developing  countries
to offer generous savings and investment  incentives.  In the 1960s,  a
complex and detailed system  of tax incentives  was part of the overall
planning  process in countries  as diverse  as Colombia,  Korea and Turkey.
More recently  there  has been a wavering  of faith in the ability  of tax
incentives  to perform a useful role in promoting  economic  development.
Some countries, such as Indonesia and Bolivia, have abandoned them
altogether while  other countries, such as Mexico and Colombia, have
substantially  pruned them.  However, a residue of countries, such as
Turkey, Korea and Morocco, continue to rely up6.i  them and offer tax
holidays  and investment  tax credits  to a wide variety  of activities  in an
effort  to influence  both  the  total  volume  of investment  and  its  allocation.
In very few countries  has the impact  of tax incentives  on total  revenues
and  tax  equity  been ascertained, let alone their effectiveness in
redirecting  resources.6/ In many countries,  however,  there is a  growing
appreciation  of the  ability  of tax  incentive  firms  to shelter  the  income  of
non-incentive  firms  from  taxation  through  transfer  pricing  and  other  income
shifting  devices.7/- 13 -
E.  Achieving  Greater  Vertical  Eauity  in  Taxation
In light of the limited  revenue  capacity  of income  taxes,  most
developing  countries  have been forced  to rely upon a variety  of indirect
taxes as their revenue  workhorses.  Typically,  sales and excise taxes,
along  with taxes  on international  trade,  comprise  at least  two thirds  of
the total  amount  of revenue  collected. Only in Zimbabwe  and Malawi  have
income  taxes  approached  anywhere  close  to one  half  of total  revenue. Many
countries have, therefore,  been concerned  to design  their structure  of
indirect  taxes  to either  reduce  or remove  the  burden  of these  taxes  on low
income  groups.  Exemptions  of basic necessities  from the value added or
other form  of sales  tax, plus the imposition  of differentially  higher  tax
rates on items of luxury consumption,  have been the instruments  most
frequently  used to achieve this goal.  The effects  of these kinds of
policies  on  horizontal  equity  have  ordinarily  been  neglected.
Some countries,  such as Zimbabwe,  have discovered  that certain
kinds of indirect  tax  ay be highly  progressive  in their impact.  For
example,  raising  import  duties  in the  presence  of quantitative  restrictions
may be an effective  way of raising  taxes  from  wealthy holders  of import
licenses. Nevertheless,  almost  all  of the  incidence  studies  that  are  cited
by the studies in the tax reform project indicate  that the bottom 20
percent  of taxpayers  in these  countries  typically  spend  10  percent  or  more
of their  income  in satisfying  various  tax  obligations.  None  of the  reforms
have achieved  notable  success  in significantly  reducing  tax  burdens  on the
poor.- 14 -
F.  The  Spectre  of  Fiscal  Deficits  and  Inflation
A majority of the countries in the tax reform project have been
plagued  by  large  and  persistent  fiscal  deficits.  Continuous  fiscal
deficits have frequently signalled the need for fundamental tax reform, and
the aura of growing fiscal crises has served to relax many of the political
barriers  standing  in  its way.  This was  clearly  the  case  in Bolivia,
Jamaica,  Turkey,  Morocco,  Mexico,  Malawi  and Zimbabwe.  Many  of  these
countries had relied upon a combination of easy access to foreign lending
and  substantial revenues from trade taxes to finance their expenditures.
With the onset of the international recession in the early 1980s and the
ensuing debt problem in many developing countries, private foreign lending
evaporated and  revenues from trade taxes declined precipitately, leaving a
legacy  of  fiscal  deficits  that  could  not  be  adequately  financed  from
domestic revenue sources.
In  three  other  countries,  Indonesia,  Korea  and  Colombia,
comprehensive tax reforms were fashioned without the underlying threat of
an  immediate fiscal crisis.  What  distinguishes this group of countries
from the rest is their relatively stable political structures and, in Korea
and Indonesia, a lack of political opposition, a situation that has allowed
these  governments  the  luxury  of  anticipating  future  fiscal needs.  In
Indonesia, for instance, the government  was able to take the long view and
introduce tax measures that promised to compensate for the expected decline
in petroleum revenues.  In Colombia, on the other hand, during the 1970s,
the government invoked its constitutional  powers in order to secure passage
of  its  tax  reform  legislation.  For  the  most  part,  however,  fiscal
deficits,  whether  current  or  projected,  have  been  the primary  impetus- 15  -
behind  tax  reforms.  Consequently,  tax  reforms  that  pay  insufficient
attention to the issue of current and future revenue adequacy are unliksly
to meet the fiscal needs of developing countries.
In  a  number  of  the  countries  studied,  fiscal  deficits  have
supplied  the  macro-economic  spark  igniting  an  inflationary  fire  that
eventually produced severe distortions in relative prices, particularly in
the value of the economy's real exchange rate and real interest rates.  In
Bolivia, for example, the intlationary flame spread quickly out of control
as  the effects  of inflation ate away at the foundations of  the revenue
system  and  created ever  larger deficits and higher  rates of  inflation.
Eventually, a  severe hyper-inflation led to  the virtual collapse of  the
fiscal system.  Althcugh  less severe in their consequences, inflationary
impulses in Turkey and  in Mexico have also been  fueled by  large fiscal
deficits.  However, not  all countries that have  experienced significant
fiscal deficits have financed them in an inflationary  manner.  Morocco, for
instance, relied upon implicit taxation during the 1970s in financing its
deficits by running up substantial arrears in its accounts  with the private
sector.  Zimbabwe has also been successfu,l  in imposing implicit taxes on
consumption  through  the  device of quantitative trade  restrictions.  By
reducing  the  supply  of  imported consumer goods, and  in the  absence  of
domestically produced  substitutes, Zimbabwe's private  savings rates have
risen to offset the negative amount of public saving.
G.  Simplifying the Tax System and Making It Work  as  Intended
Weak  tax  administration  is  a  characteristic  shared  by  most
developing countries.  Inability to collect accurate and timely information
on taxpayers circumstances, to determine who has paid tax and who has not,
to check the accuracy of taxpayers declarations, to detect the presence offraud and to collect taxes already assessed  are typical administrative
shortcomings. What is needed  to overcome  many of these  problems  is not
only  more administrative  resources  but also  better  utilization  of existing
resources, including improved training of staff.  If both direct and
indirect  tax laws  'vere  si3nificantly  simplified,  administrative  resources
could  be concentrated  on audit  and collection  functiona  with likely  gains
in both total  revenue  and  equity. Stiffer  sanctions  for  non-payment,  more
frequent  audits  to  compel  better  compliance,  shorter  lags  in the  collection
process,  the  computerization  of tax  information  (to  determine  who has  filed
a tax  return  and paid  their  taxes)  and  streamlined  legislation  may all  be
prerequisites  to achieving  true  tax  reform.
Experience in a number of tax reform countries gives ample
evidence  of the  important  gap  between  the  way in  which  the  tax  system  works
in practice  and  the  way it is spelled  out in the  tax laws.  In Korea,  for
example,  when the Office  of National  Tax Administration  was created in
1966,  total  revenues  increased  by 50  percent  due  to its  vigoeous  efforts  at
improving administration.  In Morocco, auditing  revealed  ma3sive fraud
since, on average, audits in that country raised taxable income by
approximately  a factor  of three. As is  discussed  in greater  detail  in the
next section, one result of weak tax administration  is a disturbing
discrepancy  between the nominal and effective tax rates on different
activJties  and  sources  of income  in the  economy.
H.  Widespread  Tax  Evasion  As a  Way  of Life
One consequence  of weak tax administration  is the prevalence  of
endemic  tax  evasion  in  most  developing  countries. In  many of the  countries
studied,  it was estimated  that as much as one half of all income  tax is
evaded  and  that  the  greatest  opportunities  for  evading  taxes  were available- 17 -
to richer  rather  than  poorer  taxpayers. In Bolivia,  for example,  it was
estimated  that only about 20 percent  of capital  income  ended up in the
personal  income  tax  net  compared  to 75  percent  of labor  income.
Tax evasion occurs through a myriad of different channels.
Failure  to file a tax return,  the temptation  to misrepresent  income  and
expenses,  the use of fraudulent  invoices,  and resort  to transfer  pricing
practices  involving  exempted  or preferentially  taxed  activities  are among
the most frequently  used methods of evading taxes.  In Jamaica, for
instance,  it  was discovered  that  only  about  one  in  ten  of the  self  employed
bothered  to file  a tax  return. The situation  with doctors  in  Zimbabwe  was
similar.  Evasion  also occurs  as frequently  with sales  taxes as it does
with income  taxes.  Issuing  no invoice  and thereby  under-reporting  sales
for tax purposes  or resorting  to fake invoices  in order to claim  higher
input tax credits liave  been serious problems with the VAT in several
countries  as has the  practice  of collecting  sales  tax revenue  and failing
to turn over the proceeds to the tax authorities.  With rampant tax
evasion,  tax  systems  in  many  countries  are  neither  efficient  nor  equitable.
III. TRENDS  IN  TAX  REFORM
In response  to the  issues  outlined  above,  the  developing  countries
in the sample  have all recently  reformed  their tax systems  in ways that
suggest  that  there  is a considerable  convergence  of opinion  on how  best to
deal  with these  problems. Although  there  are  som-  notable  exceptions,  the
tax reforms  examined  in this etudy  reveal  some  clearly  discernible  trends
in  taxation:
1.  In most of the tax reform  countries,  the value added tax
(VAT)  has  become  the  mainstay  of the  revenue  system.- 18 -
The  VAT  typically  accounts  for  a  thivd  or more  of  total
national tax revenue in the councries studied.  Although most
countries have chosen the consumption type of VAT levied on a
destination  basis,  a  few countries,  such  as Colombia  and
Turkey, have moved closer towards the GNP type of VAT under
their  policy  of  only  partially  refunding  taxes  paid  on
capital goods.  Indonesia recently moved  the VAT  from the
manufacturer's to the wholesqler level of application.  The
VAT still operates at the manufacturers' level in Malawi as
it will in Jamaica if the plans for a VAT mat3rialize in that
country, but it applies at the retail level in the rest of
the countries that have adopted a VAT.  Countries  with VAT at
the retail level have put in place special tax regimes for
small  retailers  for  whom  some  simplified  bookkeeping
procedures  are  desirable  on administrative grounds.  Most
countries have operated  with VATs that ha-t a single rate and
allow exemptions for basic necessities ar.d  certain hard to
tax sectors.  Exports are invariably zero rated, although in
some  countries the poor  timeliness of VAT  refunds  implies
that  exports  are  subject  to  some  unknown  tax  burden.
Multiple  rate  structures,  such  as  those  found  in Mexico,
Malawi and Turkey, appear to have been the political price
that was paid  for raising the baaic VAT rate significantly
above 10 percent.
2.  A number  uf countries have turned to a wide  assortment of
measures to create broader personal and corporate income tax
bases.- 19  -
These  measures  include  reduced  relianc0  on tax incentives,
granting  of fewer  exclusions  and exemptions,  greater  use  of
presumptive  methods  of taxation,  increased  withholding  under
both sales and income taxes, the introduction  of minimum
taxes on assets and generally  tighter tax administtation.
Korea, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey  and Bolivia, for instance,
have  all given  greater priority to  presumptive methods  of
taxation in recent reforms  while a variety of fringe benefits
have been incorporated into the tax base in countries such as
Jamaica,  Malawi  and  Turkey.  In  other  countries, notably
LMalawi,  Zimbabwe, Colombia and  Bolivia, public  enterprises
have been successfully incorporated into the corporate income
tax base.
3.  In  the  area  of  capital  income taxation, there  is perhaps
greater  recognition  in many  countries  that  the  corporate
income tax may be the only effective way of reaching capital
incomes in equity form and that some schedularization  in
taxing  non-equity  capital  income  may  be  necessary  to
compensate for weaknesses in tax administration.
A few countries, such as Bolivia and Mexico, have concluded
that  it  is  administratively  easier  to tax either  the net
worth  of companies  or the  expenditures  made  by the  recipients
of capital  income  rather  than  the  income  arising  from  capital
ownership.- 20 -
There  is considerable  diversity  in the ways  in which
countries  treat  the  taxation  of interest  income. While some
countries,  such  as Jamaica,  Malawi  and  Zimbabwe,  tax  nominal
interest  incomes  fully,  in other  countries,  such as Colombia
and Mexico, only real interest  income  is taxable.  Until
recently Indonesia exempted interest income  while other
countries,  such as Bolivia,  Morocco,  Korea  and Turkey,  have
taken  an intermediate  path  by imposing  low  withholding  taxes
on interest income.  Only Colombia has made any serious
effort  to tax capital  gains from the stock  market.  A few
countries make a half hearted  attempt to tax the capital
gains  Arising  from  real  estate  transactions.
4.  In recent years, double taxation  of dividends  has become
considerably  less onerous,  due to either  the development  of
imputation schemes or, more commonly, the  exclusion of
dividends  at the  personal  level.
Dividend exclusions currently apply in Colombia,  Bolivia,
Mexico,  Indonesia  and  Korea,  while  imputation  schemes  can be
found in Malawi and Zimbabwe.  Only Jamaica and Turkey
continue  to tax dividends  at both the  corporate  end  personal
levels.  Korea has also recently  abandoned  its presumptive
dividend  tax  that  had  been applied  to retained  earnings. In
many countries, therefore, there is less incentive for
corporations  to rely  heavily  upon debt  finance,  although  the- 21 -
common practices of either excluding or  lightly taxing
interest  income  at the personal  level still  contributes  to
the  debt  bias,  if only  in  an attenuated  form.8/
5.  Complementing  the effort  to broaden  the income  tax  base are
reforms in the rate structure  that flatten the amount of
nominal tax progressivity  and align the nominal  corporate
income  tax rate with the top bracket rate of the personal
income  tax.
Only  a few  countries,  namely  Zimbabwe  and  Korea,  now  have top
bracket  personal  income  tax rates  "hich exceed  50 percent.
In Jamaica,  there is now only a single  personal  income  tax
rate  which has been set equal  to the corporate  rate of 33.3
percent. This  movement  to less  nominal  progressivity  in the
rate  schedule  is a response  to the  realization  that  almost  no
taxpayer  ever  paid  tax  at  the  highest  rate  because
considerable  taxpayer  resources  were devoted  to avoiding  that
outcome.  Consequently, any  loss in vertical equity is
significantly  less than  a  comparison  of nominal  rate
schedules  would suggest.  In countries  such as Colombia  and
Mexico,  the top bracket  rate has been halved  in comparison
with its  value  only  a few  years  ago.
The  merging  of the corporate  and top  bracket  personal  rates
in countries  as diverse as Indonesia,  Jamaica,  Malawi and
Mexico  has  made it  easier  to  tax  small  businesses  by reducing
the temptation  to convert  capital  income  into labor income- 22 -
and vice versa, while at the same time achieving closer
parity  of  tax  treatment between  firms located in the
corporate  and  unincorporated  sectors. The  alignment  of these
two rates,  moreover,  enhances  the effective  integration  of
these  two income  taxes  through  the technique  of the  dividend
exclusion.9/
This simplification  and unification  of the rate structures
reduces opportunities for tax avoidance while the lower
personal rates may  also weaken  the  incentive to evade
personal tax.10/  As a result,  whatever loss of vertical
equity  may have occurred  as a result  of these  developments,
there  may be offsetting  gains in administrative  simplicity
and  the attainment  of greater  horizontal  equity. Similarly,
the introduction  of a  single  deduction  under the personal
income  tax in Colombia,  Mexico  and  Jamaica  may also improve
horizontal  equity at the expense  of some unknown  cost to
vertical  equity. Flatter  rrte structures  also contribute  to
more accurate  withholding  and  easier  tax  administration.
6.  Increasing  indexation  of the  income  tax  system  in response  to
persistent  inflation  and  the  problems  of capital  flight.
Many  countries, particularly Colombia and Mexico, have
progressed from ad hoc inflation  adjustments  and partial
indexation measures to more  satisfactory and virtually
complete  indexation  of the entire  tax system. Colombia  and
Mexico  are  unique  among  the  countries  in tax  reform  sample  in- 23 -
trying to tax only real interest income and in allowing only
the  deductibility  of  real  interest expense.  Depreciation
allowances are also fully indexed in these two countries.  A
number of countries, particularly Bolivia, Turkey and Mexico,
learned that the failure to index brackets for the personal
income tax triggered a profusion of untaxed fringe benefits.
There has also been a shift in commodity taxation towards the
use of ad valorem rather than specific tax rates.  During the
inflationary 1970s, many  countries discovered that specific
tax rates were  quickly eroded by  the effects of  inflation
which contributed to decli ing real tax yields.
7.  Most  countries have  shown an  interest in designing  excise
taxes  that  extract  larger  tax  payments  from  non-poor
households.
To  some  extent,  this  tendency  reflects  the  growing
specialization  of  tax  instruments  rather  than  having  a
multiple  rate value  added  tax which  serves  a variety  of
different purposes and renders the administration of that tax
much more difficult.  The VAT has typically been assigned the
role of raising revenues while excise taxes have been given
the task of imparting greater progressivity to the system as
a  whole.11/ By the same token, there is increasing acceptance
of  the  notion  that  tariffs  should be used  for protective
purposes rather than for raising revenues.- 24 -
8.  The  vast  majority  of tax  reforming  countries  have recognized
that improvements  in all facets  of tax administration  are
required. To obtain  better  compliance,  all  of the  countries
considered  have made efforts to create  a unique taxpayer
identification numbering system.  This, along with the
computerized  processing  of  tax  -eturns, has  enabled
governments  to  maintain  a  much  better  check  on  non-filers  and
stop  filers. Collection  efficiency  has  also  improved  through
the increased  use of banks to receive,  and to some extent
process,  tax  payments  and  the  concentration  of  audit
resources  on  the  country's  largest  taxpayers.  Some
countries,  for example Colombia, have made  greater use  of
withholding as a form of final tax payment, thus freeing up
administrative  resources  for  the  tasks  of  collection  and
audit.
There  is  also  a  growing  awareness  of  important
complementarities that may  exist in tax administration.  A
number  of  countries  now  seem  to  recognize  that  if  the
administration of the VAT is weak, it will be much harder to
obtain  satisfactory  compliance  with  the  personal  and
corporate income taxes.  Conversely, a well administered VAT
may  generate  improvements  in  documentation  that  make  it
significantly easier to administer both income taxes.  A few
countries have turned to innovative  approaches in their
efforts to secure greater compliance with the VAT.  Turkey's
expenditure  rebate  system  and Bolivia's  complementary tax- 25 -
both offer limited income tax credits to households for their
collection  of  tax-paid  invoices  and  are  examples  of  the
attempt to use the fiscal carrot rather than the fiscal stick
to  obtain better tax  compliance.  Both schemes offer  some
resistance to the temptation to accept a seller's offer of a
lower price and no purchase invoice.
9.  Taken  together,  most  of the major  elements of  recent  tax
reforms  have  the  potential  to  reduce  the  extent  of  tax
evasion significantly.  Fewer tax incentives, the development
of  broader  tax  bases  and  lower  tax  rates,  administrative
improvements  in  the  area  of  information,  audit  and
collection, greater reliance on indirect  taxes, the exemption
or schedular treatment of many forms of capital income and
the experimentation  with special compliance measures can all
help make tax evasion both less feasible and less desirable.
IV.  SOME LESSONS FROM TAX REFORM
The lessons of tax reform can be usefully separated into those
that throw some light on the process of tax reform and those that have
something to say about the substance of tax reform.  After these lessons
are spelled out and discussed, the concluding section of this paper tries
to identify some of the critical ingredients of a successful tax reform.
A.  The Process  of  Tax  Reform
1.  Tax reforms are more likely  to be introduced when the need
for  them  is clear  to  politicians,  policy  makers  and  the
population alike.- 26 -
Fiscal  crises  typically  signalled  by persistent  and growing
deficits  create  a sympathetic  political  environment  in  which
governments  are seriously prepared to contemplate  reform.
The  tax  reforms of Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Malawi,
Morocco, Jamaica, Turkey and Zimbabwe all fit into this
mould.  Conversely,  and  perhaps  more controversially,  fiscal
surpluses  may give governments  the latitude  to engage in
various kinds of tax deform (a "reform"  which authorizes
additional  distorting  tax  preferences).  Although  few
countries have  enjoyed the luxury of  sustained fiscal
surpluses,  the periodic  coincidence  of these surpluses  and
tax  deform  in  a few  countries  lend  some  support  to this  view.
2.  Strong  and  stable  governments  that  en,oy  continuity  of  office
may be in a position  to take a long  view of the economy's
future course of development  and to adopt preemptive  tax
reforms  that  may  avert  the  threat  of potential  fiscal  crises.
The  tax  reform  experiences  of Korea  and  Indonesia  seem  to fit
this pattern fairly well.  In both of these  countries
political longevity has enabled governments  to refashion
their tax systems in ways that were consistent  with the
economy's  long  term  economic  objectives  and  plans.
Conversely,  as the experience  of Bolivia  and Turkey's  non-
military regimes suggests, weak  and  internally divided
governments  may be unable to cope adequately  with fiscal
crises  and may suffer  from continuous  fiscal  deficits  as a
result  of this  debility.- 27 -
3  It is extremely important to have the appropriate  policy
measures "on the shelf" before  a  fiscal  crisis  occurs in
order  to forestall  the  adoption  of ad hoc  and  ill  advised  tax
reforms.
For example,  the governments  of Jamaica,  Morocco  and  Malawi,
had  no clear,  well thought  out  plans  on how  to deal  with the
fiscal  crises  that  beset  them  in  the  early  1980s.
Consequently  all of them attempted to stem their revenue
shortfall  by raising  tax rates  on badly  distorted  tax  bases.
Fortunately,  none of these  countries  saw this response  as a
sustainable  long  run  policy  option  and  all  of  them
subsequently  undertook  fundamental  tax reforms,  with varying
degrees  of  success.  One  implication of this  is that
desirable  tax  reforms  may have  a long  gestation  period  before
they are  finally adopted, as was  the case in Colombia.
Moreover,  consulting  with local  people and officials  about
the  options  for reform  in an ongotng  fashion  before  a fiscal
emergency  arises  can give  economic  planning  a greater  chance
of success.
4.  Influential  and well informed  advisors  have often played  a
critical  role in  bringing  about  satisfactory  tax  reforms.
The imprint  of tax  policy  experts  in  setting  the  broad  agenda
for  reform,  in guiding  the  discussion  of reform  possibilities
and in supporting  particular  tax measures  while rejecting- 28  -
others is clearly evident in the reforms that have been
carried  out  in Jamaica,  Indonesia,  Malawi,  Zimbabwe,
Colombia,  Korea  and, to a lesser  extent,  Turkey. Mexico  and
Bolivia have shown a greater  propensity  than the rest to
develop  home  grown  tax  reforms. Large  amounts  of foreign  aid
on the  other hand, as illustrated  by the experience of
Turkey, may have delayed the adoption of desirable tax
reforms  by relaxing  the  balance  of  payments  pressures  created
by sustained  fiscal  deficits.
5.  From  an historical  vantage  point,  tax  reform  is  best seen  as
a  continuous  process  in  which there  is substantial  learning
by doing, continual adjustment  and refinement  of the tax
system  and a gradual  groping  towards  the achievement  of a
better  tax  system.
The experiences  of Korea,  Mexico, Colombia  and Turkey all
suggest  that  the  process  of tax  reform  is never  finished. As
new ideas  and fashions  take hold, as the technology  of tax
collection  changes  and as a country's  economic  circumstances
are altered,  new opportunities  will arise for improving  a
country's  tax  system. This  is  not  to  deny  that  countries  may
occasionally stray from the path of true tax reform as
Colombia  did in the late 1970s  when it partially  reversed
some  of the  reforms  introduced  earlier  in the  decade.
6.  Undue haste and inadequate  preparation  in introducing  tax
reforms  may create  substantial  waste  and  eventually  doom  them
to failure.- 29 -
Bolivia's ill fated effort to introduce a value added tax  in
1976 provides  the beet  illustration of  this lesson.  Few
resources  were committed to educating the public on how a VAT
operates,  to  creating  an administrative apparatus  to  deal
effectively  with  its  implementation  and  to  a  careful
designing of the tax forms.  Not surprisingly, the new sales
tax  failed  to  live  up  to  its  promise.  The  much  more
successful reforms introduced in Jamaica, Indonesia and, more
recently, in Malawi all benefitted from detailed and careful
planning and preparation pius close monitoring after their
implementation.
7.  Good data and a reliable empirical analysis of the effects of
the pre- and post-reform systems are vital prerequisites to
convincing doubters of the soundness of proposed tax changes.
Successful tax reform measures ordinarily require a detailed
knowledge of the defects of the current system, particularly
a sense of who pays taxes at the industry, firm and household
level.  They also require a feeling for how the distribution
of  tax  burdens will  be  affected by  tax measures  that are
supposed  to make  matters  better.  The  recent  tax  reform
erforte  in  Jamaica,  Colombia,  Malawi  a.d  Indonesia  all
display  this attribute.  The margin,.l  effective  tax rate
methcdology  is  also  increasingly  being  applied  to  measure  the
allocative  impact  of  different  tax  policies.- 30 -
8.  Reforms  are  more likely  to be adopted  if local  policymakero
are  actively  involved  in their  design  and implementation  and
if the reforms  result  in the formation  of a cadre  of local
tax  experts.
Recent reforms in Colombia,  Malawi, Indonesia  and Jamaica
have  proved  the  importance  of securing  a strong  commitment  to
the reform process and the measures themselves.  Without
active  iocal  engagement  the reforms  are not woven into the
country's  institutional  structure  and  important  opportunities
for  institution  building  are  missed.
9.  Comprehensive  tax reform,  insofar  as it creates  winners as
well as losers,  may  meet  with less  political  resistance  than
piecemeal  tax  reform.
The recent  reforms  in Colombia,  Mexico  and Jamaica  seem to
suggest  t'  - if everyone has both  a  little to gain and  a
little  to  lose  from  a  tax  reform package,  political
opposition  to the reform  will be unable  to coalesce  around  a
particular  issue.  Alternatively,  if the number  of winners
from  a reform  is large  enough,  they  may be able  to inflict  a
political  defeat  on any coalition  of losers. If,  however,  a
reform  took  aim  at  a particular  tax  distortion,  the  political
outcry from those who benefit by its existence  might be
sufficient  to destroy  the  initiative.- 31 -
10.  Potential  improvements  in simplicity  and horizontal  equity
are  strong  selling  points  in  favor  of  a tax  reform. Gains  in
economic  efficiency  and  vertical  equity,  on the other  hand,
are  much  harder  to sell.
Support  for  the  recent  reforms  in  Indonesia,  Colombia,  Mexico
and Jamaica seems to spring  in large  part from the public
expectation  that the reforms  would produce  a more uniform
distribution of tax burdens across different firms and
industries  in the  economy  and across  different  households  at
the same income  level.  Similarly,  complex  tax rules  were
seen  as invitations  to avoid  and evade  them  which  undermines
the ability  of the tax system  to achieve  horizontal  equity.
Efficiency arguments, on the  other hand,  are not well
understood  by the  public  and  vertical  equity  is very  much a
matter  of personal  judgement.
11. An unstable  macro-environment  may threaten  and even eclipse
tax reforms  that are popularly  perceived  to be a source  of
the  instability.
While  the reform in Jamaica and a  few other countries
demonstrates  that recession  is not a barrier  to introducing
reforms,  the experience  of Colombia,  Turkey  and, perhaps  to
some extent, Mexico indicates  that if some macro-economic
difficulty  occurs  after the reforms  are put in place, the
reforms  may be blamed  for  the  coincident  macro  distress. In
some  cases  the  weight  of this  accusation  may  be sufficient  to
force  the  repeal  of the  tax  reforms.- 32 -
12.  In general, there seems to be a logical sequence to fiscal
reform,  although  the  empirical  evidence  in  favor of  this
proposition is embarrassingly thin.
Implicit  in much  of what  has  been  said  thus  far  is  the
assumption  that  the  expenditure  policies  of  developing
countries are selected and executed in an efficient manner.
Stories of white elephants abound to cast great doubt on this
supposition.  It clearly makes no sense to make tax policies
more  efficient  and  effective  if  the  revenues  which  they
produce  are  used  to  finance an  inefficient set  of public
expenditures.  In this sense, if expenditure reform does not
accompany tax reform, it should precede it.  Moreover, reform
of structural tax policy should ideally  precede the reform of
tax administration since there is not much merit in making a
bad  tax system work  somewhat better; that is, improve2 tax
administration can never compensate for bad tax design.  At
the same time, however, improved tax policiets  will never work
properly unless  they can  be  effectively administered.  In
this sense, improved tax administration is frequently the key
element in a successful tax reform.  Finally, the experience
with  tax reform in Morocco makes  it clear that  tax reform
should  logically  come  before  tariff  re.orm.  If  tariffs
constitute a significant fraction of total revenues, as they
did in Morocco, tariff reductions will bring fiscal deficits
in  their  wake  unless,  or  until,  the  tax  system  can  be
effectively revamped to replace the foregone tariff revenue.- 33 -
B.  The  Substance  of Tax  Reform: Haior  Themes
The reform  experiences  we have examined  have addressed  a host of
technical issues concerning  the choice and application  of various tax
instruments.  This  section  focuses  on the  major  themes  that  emerge  from  the
efforts  of these  countries  to improve  the  performance  of their  tax  systems.
These  lessons,  or bits  of practical  advice,  constitute  a core  of basic  tax
reform  principleE  on "what  to  do."
1.  Tax  reform  measures  need  to  conform  to  exiating
administrative  capacities.
Exceeding  administrative  limits  almost  always  results  in poor
compliance  and widespread  evasion that  will compromise  the
goals of revenue,  equity and efficiency.  Administrative
feasibility  can be met in several  ways, in particular  by
keeping  the tax system  simple  and avoiding  fine tuning,  by
broadening  tax  bases and reducing  both average  and  marginal
tax rates, by relying primarily on indirect sources of
revenue,  by devising  workable  presumptive  income  taxes (or
minimum taxes),  by looking  to the expenditure  side of the
budget  for  redistributlon,  by aligning  the  corporate  and top
bracket personal Lax rates and last, but not least, by
investing  in improved  administrative  capability.
High tax  rates  on narrow  bases  are  arguably  more inefficient
because  they dis.ort  decision  making  to a greater  degree  by
encouraging  savings,  investment,  consumption  and the  earning
of income  in tax  preferred  forms.  They  are also  more prone
to perpetuate  horizontal  inequities  (although  inefficiency- 34 -
may eliminate  some apparent  horizontal  inequities)  and they
are certainly more difficult to administer because they
invite greater tax evasion and  raise compliance costs.
Broader  and simpler  tax bases have been chosen  by Jamaica,
Korea,  Malawi,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Bolivia  and  Indonesia. The
undesirable  features  of narrow  and administratively  complex
tax bases  have been amply  demonstrated  by the  experience  of
Morocco which  has  functioned with  a narrow and highly
differentiated  tax  system  for  a  number  of years.
Although  in principle  special  tax  regimes  should  broaden  the
tax base, in practice  many of them may narrow  the base by
inducing ordinary  taxpayers  to take  advantage of  the
disparate  tax treatments  accorded  under the special  regime
and the normal tax system.  Consequently,  at least some
special  tax  regimes  may  result  in  a loas  of total  revenue  and
may  impair  the  tax  system's  ability  to generate  equitable  and
efficient  outcomes.
As a result  of the  unification  of corporate  and top  bracket
personal rates, there is a much smaller pay off to the
conversion  of labor income  into more lightly  taxed  capital
income on the part of corporations  and small businesses.
Also,  in  conjunction  with the  exclusion  of dividend  income  at
the personal level rate, this unification  has provided  a
reasonably  effective  method  of integrating  the  tax  treatment
of d4vidend  income.  In every country it has proven  much
easier  to tax the flow of dividend  income  at the corporate
rather  than  the  personal  level.- 35 -
A number of countries also recognize that different parts of
the tax system  can provide  mutual support  for one another.
Thus, for example,  a well functioning  value added tax can
assist  in the administration  of both corporate  and personal
income  taxes  by providing  detailed  information  on important
items  such  as gross  receipts  and  deductions. In  Colombia,  on
the other hand, a well administered  net wealth tax was
indispensible  for the  effective operation of both  the
presumptive income tax and the tax on capital gains.12/
Other countries  besides  Colombia  either  have not tried  net
wealth taxes or have had only limited  success in applying
them.
In reforming  taxes,  is it better  to build on existing  tax
instruments  or to replace  them instead  with fresh  ones?  As
the contrasting  experiences  of Malawi  and Bolivia  indicate,
both approaches  may be required  if tax reform  measures  are
forced to conform with  current administrative  capacity.
Malawi  felt  it was  easier  to refashion  existing  tax
instruments while  Bolivia reacted to its inability to
administer an orthodox income tax system effectively  by
discarding  it and replacing  it with a set of simpler  taxes
that  promises  to  be easier  to implement.
It is unlikely  that  future  tax  reforms,  like  those  in  recent
years, will be driven by vertical equity considerations.
Because of the interplay  of weak tax administration  and
political  preferences,  the effective  progressivity  of both- 36 -
personal and corporate income  taxes has been found to be
substantially  less than that implied  by legislative  rates.
Nominal  progressivity  has accordingly  been tailored  to suit
administrative  realities in most countries.  Top marginal
rates  under  the personal  income  tax have been substantially
reduced  in several  countries  while  the  nominal  corporate  tax
rate has been significantly  lowered  as well.  Concern  over
triggering  capital  flight  and increased  recognition  of the
distorting  effects  of  high  marginal  tax  rates  have reinforced
this  tendency  to adopt  lower  rates.
2.  It is important  to design  tax and expenditure  systems  that
will minimize  current  deficits  and the prospects  of future
fiscal  deficits.
Small, open economies  such as Bolivia,  Malawi and Morocco
which  have  relied  heavily  on export  taxes  as a revenue  source
have  been  particularly  prone  to experience  fiscal  deficits  as
a result of any downturn in the international  economy.
Countries such as these that cannot  easily c..ltivate  more
stable  revenue sources  require  either flexible  expenditure
systems  or the  establishment  of a stabilization  fund  if they
are  adequately  to contain  the  size  of future  fiscal  deficits.
Revenue  elastic  tax  systems also help  to prevent the
emergence  of  fiscal deficits during periods of  stable
economic  growth.- 37 -
Because  they  are  more often  than  not financed  through  Certral
Banks,  fiscal deficits may  be more pernicious in their
inflationary  impact  in  developing  than  in developed
countries.  Of all of the methods  of taxation  available  to
governments,  the  inflation  tax  has  been  shown  to  be among  the
least desirable  of tax instruments. The inflation  tax is
both highly  inequitable  and highly  distorting,  particularly
in an unindexed  tax system.  Either  by levying  higher tax
rates  or by administrative  or statutory  efforts  to  expand  the
size of the tax base, explicit  taxation  is almost always
preferable  to the implicit  inflation  tax.  Choosing  between
these  two  explicit  tax  options  turns  on a comparison  between
the efficiency  costs  of highei  rates  and the resource  costs
of greater  administrative  effort. If rates  are  already  high,
there  is a  presumption in favor of more  diligent tax
administration.
If,  however,  a high  rate inflation  is  viewed  as unavoidable,
it is important  to index  both direct  and indirect  taxes in
order to maintain real tax revenues and avoid inflation
induced  inequities  and distortions  in the tax treatment  of
both  capital  and  labor  incomes.
Contrary to conventional  wisdom, the absence of inuexing
measures  may  frequently be destabilizing and may make
inflation  more rather  thar,  less  likely. As the  experience  of
Bolivia graphically illustrates,  unindexed commodity tax- 38 -
bases are especially vulnerable to inflationary erosion and
can  contribute  to explosive  macroeconomic  instability  as
accelerating  rates  of  inflation create ever  larger fiscal
deficits.
As was particularly evident in the case of Turkey, inflation
in  an unindexed tax system will  often raise effective tax
rates  on  labor  incomes  while  reducing  them  on  capital
incomes.  This effect occurred as more workers were elevated
into  higher  tax  brackets  and  as  nominal  interest
deductability reduced the size of the corporation income tax
base.  Inflationary episodes in Turkey, Bolivia and Mexico,
and  also  to  some  extent  in  Colombia,  suggested  that  an
unindexed personal income tax that results in bracket creep
is an  important stimulant to  the growth of untaxed  fringe
benefits.  However,  the provision of these fringe benefits
occurred very unevealy across different groups in the labor
force with consequent damage to both vertical and horizontal
equity.
In  the  absence  of  indexation  inflation  also  produces
substantial inequities and distortions in the tax treatment
of capital income.  Debt finance is artificially encouraged
while taxes on nominal interest income are transformed into
covert  wealth taxes.- 39 -
Explicit  and  comprehensive  indexing  is  preferable  to  a
variety of ad hoc measures intended to provide partial relief
from inflationary tax effects on capital income.  Under the
indexing schemes recently introduced in Colombia and Mexico,
only  real  interest  income  is  taxable  and  real  interest
expense is deductible.  Both  of these countries have  also
adopted  inflation proof methods  of measuring  depreciation,
and Colombia also provides for indexed treatment of capital
gains.
3.  Despite  the  desirability  of  obtaining  broader  income  tax
bases,  there  are  significant  structural  and  economic
constraints on the achievement of a comprehensive and global
income tax.
The  substantial  size  of  the  informal  sector  in  most
developing countries severely limits the reach of the income
tax.  Besides these enforcement restrictions, the scope of
the  income  tax  is  also  restricted  by  measurement
difficulties, the provision of tax incentives and the power
of special interests to obtain exemptions and exclu4ions.  No
example could be found of a personal income tax thst:  included
more than a third of the economy's capital income in its tax
base.  The  corporation  income  tax,  moreover,  cannot
adequately compensate for this skimpy coverage because it is
a tax on only one form of capital income, that part which is
received  in the  form of equity.  Large portions of  labor
income in the form of fringe benefits are also excluded from
the personal tax base in many countries.- 40 -
The  increasing  integration  of the  world's  capital  markets  and
the  dismantling  of capital  market  controls  in most countries
have  exerted  considerable  pressure  on developing  countries  to
either reduce or even eliminate their taxes on interest
income. At the same  time,  reluctance  to tax interest  income
when combined with the deductibility  of interest  expense
opens  up significant  opportunities  for  both  tax  arbitrage  and
tax evasion.  Highly levered  company  financial  structures
also become a by-product  of this unequal  tax treatment  of
debt  and  equity.
It is not entirely clear  what the appropriate  policy for
treating interest income should be.  If fear of capital
flight and inability to enforce the residence principle
causes  interest  income  on  domestic  deposits  to  be exempt  from
tax,  this  exemption  will probably  create  pressures  to reduce
tax burdens on other forms of capital income,  especially
dividend  income  and capital  gains,  if for no other reason
than to mitigate  the financial distortions that would
otherwise  occur.  On the  one hand,  if a country  attempts  to
include  interest  income  in the  tax  base,  the  effect  is likely
to be higher  domestic  interest  rates as the effective  tax
burden  is shifted  forward  to domestic  consumers  in general
and to owners  of immobile  land  and labor  in particular. If
this  were the case, it might  be argued  that reliance  on at.
income  tax  excluding  interest  income  and  other  components  of
capital  income  (an expenditure  tax),  or on a general  sales- 41 -
tax,  would be preferable  since,  with either  of these  taxes,
the  distribution  of  tax burdens  could be more  easily
predicted  and  a tax induced  distortion  in the  capital  market
would be avoided.  If, on the other hand, interest  income
were excluded  from the tax base, there is an argument  for
making  interest  expense  non-deductible  in order  to curb tax
arbitrage.  Such an approach, however,  could very easily
jeopardize  the  availability  of foreign  tax  credits  and  raise
the economy's  cost of capital  from foreign  sources.  There
seem to be no easy answers.  What is clearer,  however,  is
that a global  capital  market exerts  powerful  pressures  on
developing  countries  to replace  conventional  income  taxes  on
individuals  with either  direct  or indirect  taxes based on
consumption.
Given these  weaknesses  in the personal  taxation  of capital
income,  a  pivota.l  role  for  the  corporate  income  tax is  to see
that  the  equity  component  of capital  income  is  taxed  at least
or.ce. The other role for this instrument  is to tax the
domestic source income of foreign corporations and any
economic  rents  received  by both  domestic  and  foreign
companies.
An important  design  feature  in the reform  of the corporate
income  tax is the trade  off  between  low  rominal  rates  and  no
investment  incentives  versus nominal corporate rates and
liberal investment  incentives.13/  Most of the countries
examined  have opted  for  the former  policy. Malawi,  however,- 42 -
has recently  opted  for a  relatively  high corpor.te  tax rate
combined  with a partial  first  year  write off for investment
in the manufacturing  sector.  Zimbabwe remains the only
country  in  which  complete  expensing  of investment  is allowed,
but it also  unwisely  permits  interest  deductibility,  thereby
subsidizing  investment.
4.  Tax  measures  and instruments  need to be closely  targeted  to
the  objective  they  are intended  to achieve  and the  number  of
non-revenue  objectives  should  be  kept  to a  minimum.
Indirect  or  poorly  targeted  tax  measures  almost  always  create
new problems and often generate  undesirable  side effects.
For example, Colombia adopted for a number of years an
accelerated  depreciation  scheme  in an attempt  to compensate
for the impact  of inflation  upon corporate  income  taxation.
Such  measures  are  crude  at best  and  can  only  offset  inflation
for a particular  rate of price increase. At the same time,
however,  such a scheme  injects  significant  non-neutralities
into the tax system  by influencinac  the choice  of investment
among  different  sectors  and assets.  As a further  example,
many countries grant an outright exemption for all food
purchases  under  the  value  added  tax  in  an effort  to reduce  or
even  eliminate  the  regressive  features  of that  tax. However,
by exempting  all food purchases  rather  than only the items
purchased  by low income  households,  the  exemption  may confer
larger absolute benefits on the rich than on the poor.
Protective  excise  taxes  and revenue  raising  tariff  policies
provide  further  examples  of poor  targeting.- 43 -
In many developing  countries,  there  is now considerably  more
doubt  about the ability  of tax incentives  to achieve  their
intended  objectives.  Many,  though  not  all,  of the  tax  reform
countries  have restricted  the scope and application  of tax
incentives  as part of a growing  awareness  that their  costs
may be substantially  higher  and  their  benefits  significantly
lower  than  was previously  thought  to  be true.
5.  Most tax  reform  measures  will ordinarily  require  making  trade
offs  among  the  normal  criteria  that  are  used to evaluate  tax
changes.  However,  the goals  of simplicity,  neutrality  and
horizontal  equity frequently complement  one another; all
three  of these  objectives  clash  with the  pursuit  of vertical
equity.
For instance, attempts to obtain greater vertical equity
typically  invoke  the  use  of differentiated  tax rates  and  tax
treatments that clash with the policy requiements  for
simplicity, neutrality  and  horizontal  equity.  In an
inflationary  environment,  indexation  may be required for
greater tax  neutrality  and  equitable  treatment  among
investment  choices  but  it  almost  always  adds  to
administrative complexity.  Further conflict may  occur
between  growth  and  equity  since  the  former  objectives  stress
reliance  on consumption  taxes  while  the latter  goal  calls  for
the elimination  of taxes on the consumption  oi the poor.
Korea  provides  an example  of a country  that,  at least  until
recently,  placed  more priority  on achieving  higher  rates  of- 44 -
economic  growth  than  on attaining  greater  equity  in  taxation.
There may also be some tension  between the size of total
revenue  and the pursuit  of an equitable  distribution  of tax
burdens.  In Zimbabwe,  for instance,  the relatively  large
government sector has  already exhausted the use of tax
instruments  that fall primarily  on the rich and has forced
the government to turn to marginal revenue sources that
impinge  very heavily  on the poor.  On balance,  most of the
recent reforms have stressed  the importance  of achieving
greater  simplicity,  neutrality  and  horizontal  equity  and  have
pursued  these  goals  at the  expense  of  vertical  equity.
Despite  the prevalence  of policy trade  offs, opportunities
may exist  in many countries  for  simultaneous  improvements  in
many dimensions  of tax policy performance.  For example,
presumptive  taxes, such as those levied  on net wealth in
Colombia and on indicators  of the standard of living in
Turkey, may  usefully compensate for weaknesses  in tax
administration  and  produce  unambiguous  gains  in  neutrality  as
well as both horizontal  and  vertical  equity. Minimum  taxes
along the lines  of those recently  enacted for Turkish and
Mexican  corporations  may do likewise.14/ The replacement  in
several  countries  of numerous  cascaded  commodity  taxes  by a
value  added  tax  has  also contr-  .ted to unambiguous  gains  in
efficiency,  equity  and  ease  of  administration.
The  goals  of tax  reform  are  now  more  modest  and  perhaps  also
more realistic  than they  were previously. Many tax experts
would  argue  that rough  justice  is the  best  target  to aim for- 45 -
rather  than some ideal  but administratively  hopeless  notion
of perfect  justice. From this  standpoint,  for instance,  the
policy  of  excluding  dividends  from  the  personal  income  tax  is
preferable  to  the  more  conceptually  accurate  but
administratively  more complex  imputation  approach  as  a method
of integrating  corporate  and personal  taxes.  By the same
token,  a single  VAT  rate  accompanied  by an exemption  for  food
is considered  to be better  than  a  multiplicity  of VAT rates.
Similarly,  many would argue that a  single rate personal
income tax combined  with a generous  personal  exemption  is
better  than a system  that has sharply  progressive  tax rates
and a variety  of deductions  and credits.  Colombia,  Mexico
and Jamaica,  for instance,  have all recently  eliminated  a
variety of tax deductions  and replaced  them with a single
deduction  that  more or less  approximates  the  minimum  wage in
each  country.
Streamlining  deductions,  disallowing  deductions  for losses
against  unrelated  income  and  the  imposition  of  thin
capitalization  rules  for  domestic  as well  as  foreign
companies are all examples  of attempts  to tailor  the tax
system  to  fit  existing  administrative  capabilities.  Although
these  measures  and others  like them inevitably  create  some
inequity  by ruling  out finer distinctions  among taxpayers,
they  may also  curb  larger  inequities  arising  from  tax  evasion
and avoidance  and are considered  to be the lesser  of two
evils.  These  simpler measures may  succeed where more
sophisticated  meas,res  would  fail.- 46 -
In keeping  with the  more modest  aims of recent  tax policy,
avoiding  tax  induced  resource  misallocation  and
administratively complicated measures have assumid more
importance  than  using  the  tax system  either  to spur  economic
development  or to redistribute  income.  These latter  tasks
are  now thought  to be han6iAd  much  better  on the  expenditure
side  of the  budget. Attempts  to  use  the  tax  system  tor  these
purposes  may  fail if for no other reason than that they
impair  effective  tax  administration and encourage tax
evasion.
6.  The  value  added  tax (VAT)  has  worked  well in  most countries,
having  succeeded  in raising  substantial  amounte  of revenue
ani in removing  the  burden  of indirect  taxation  from exports
and  investment  expenditures.
However,  experience  has sliown  that it is possible  to design
bad VATs and to impair their effectiveness  by adopting
multiple rates and adding numerous  exemptions.  Like any
other  ta ,  the  VAT  must be carefully  crafted  and implemented
if  it is to  work  well.  Experience  seems  to suggest,  however,
that  as the  general  rate  of the  VAT increases,  the  political
process  in  max.y  developing  countries  will extract  concessions
in the form of a multiple rate structure.  For example,
concern  over the regressive  impact  of a higher  value added
tax in both Mexico and Turkey compelled policymakers  to
accept  a VAT  with numerous  rates  with all  its  administrative
complexities.  15/- 47 -
In  choosing  a  destination  based  VAT  to  replace  an  odd
assortment  of  taxes  on  imports  and  domestic inputs, many
developing  countries  have  significantly  enhanced  the
coordination  of  their  trade  and  domestic  indirect  taxes.
Nevertheless, there are a few instances where commercial and
tax policies  were  reformed  simultaneously  and  the danger
remains  that  efforts  to  reform  tariff  policies  may
inadvertently distort a country's indirect tax system,  For
example,  tariffs  on  imported  inputs may  produce  greater
uniformity in effective rates of protection but, by making
accurate border tax adjustments more difficult, at the cost
of more  distortion  in  the  configuration  of  indirect  tax
burdene.
Besides contributing to total revenue, luxury based excise
taxes have the important  role in most developing countries of
securing a more equitable burden of in.direct  taxation.  In
order to accomplisb this objective, developing countries need
to produce reliable income and expenditure data since what is
deemed to be a luxury in one country may  be otherwise for
other countries.
Given  the  relative  importance  of  indirect  taxes  in  the
revenue  systems  of  developing  countries,  the  key  equity
concern under a tax reform is to design and apply both sales
and excise taxes that impact as  little as possible on  low
income groups in the economy.  However, almost all of the- 48 -
incidence  calculations  that are includIed  in the tax reform
sample  indicate  that  the  bottom  quintile  of households  bears
a  significant  tax  burden,  on occasion  reaching  as high as 10
percent  or  more  of household  income.16/
V.  CONCLUSION
Successful  tax  reforms  have  a number  of common  elements:  they  stem
from a well thought  out program  of &ction  and a clear  perception  of the
problems  of the pre-reform  tax system;  they are staunchly  supported  by
major  policymakers  and  local  technocrats;  they  are  carefully  and
systematically  implemented  and monitored;  they use tax incentives  only
sparingly  and instead  aim  for  broader  and  simpler  tax  bases  on  which  lower
marginal  rates  are imposed;  they  not only  avoid  raising  taxes  on the  poor
but  make  some  effort  to reduce  tax  burdens  on this  group;  they  refrain  from
making procedural demands that overwhelm tax administration  capacities
while investing  more resources  in training  and in upgrading  the level  of
administrative performance; they pay attention to interactions  among
different  components  of the  tax  system  and  do  not  neglect  the  importance  of
revenue  adequacy;  they  rely  primarily,  if not  exclusively,  on tax  measures
that are directly  targeted  to the objectives  which they are intended  to
achieve;  they  emphasize  the  importance  of  horizontal  equity,  neutrality  and
simplicity;  and they accept  a state  of crude  justice  in taxation  rather
than  striving  for  the  unattainable  goal  of  complete  justice.
The preceding  guidelines  for reforming  taxes  are,  however,  of an
extremely  general nature.  Extreme caution should be exercised in
transferring  solutions to particular tax problems across different- 49 -
countries.  Inter-country  variations in administrative  capability, in
initial economic conditions and in behavior all suggest the need to
prescribe  tax remedies  that are appropriate  to the patient's  ills.  For
example,  sophisticated  indexation  may work in Colombia  bAt not in Morocco
where administrative  complexity  is already  at high levels.  Regressive
indirect  taxes  may be of greater  concern  in Bolivia  than in Korea  where
household  income  disparities  are less  marked.  It may be feasible  to tax
interest  income  in Zimbabwe  where  capital  markets  are  highly  regulated  but
not in Mexico.  What is a luxury  in one country  and, therefore,  highly
eligible  for excise  taxation  may not be perceived  as a luxury  in another
country.  Despite reservations  of this kind, the broad lessons  outlined
above suggest  that several  important  facets  of tax reform  experience  can
indeed  be generalized  and that  countries  can learn  a  great  deal from each
other's  successes  and  failures.- 50 -
FOOTNOTES
l/  Yitzhaki  and Thirsk (1990)  use the concept  of welfare  dominance  to
illustrate  how it may be possible  to identify  welfare-improving  tax
reforms that are virtually free of value judgements concerning
interpersonal  equity.
2/  Once the resource costs of collecting  taxes are recognized,  the
optimal use  of a  tax instrument is determined by equating the
marginal administrative  cost of raising another  dollar of revenue
from  better  enforcement  with the  marginal  excess  burden  per  dollar  of
revenue  that  results  from  raising  the  rates  of existing  taxes.
3/  Some countries  such as Turkey,  restrict  crediting  for  purchases  of
capital  capital  goods  under  the  VAT while others,  such as CAombia,
deny  a  credit  except  for imported  capital  goods.  The rationale  for
this  practice  rests  partly  on revenue  grounds  but  also  in the  awkward
attempts  of these countries  to offset the impact  of subsidies  to
capital  use found elsewhere  in either  the tax or foreign  exchange
rate systems. This is also one  example  of poor targeting  discussed
later  on in  the  paper.
4/  Prior to the adoption  of its VAT, Indonesia,  for instance,  taxed
imports  at differentially  higher rates under ite sales and excise
taxes.  Colombia, on the other hand, granted a VAT exemption  to
purchasers of foreign, but not domestic, capital goods after it
adopted  the  VAT.
5/  The situation  is further  complicated  by the  provision  of foreign  tax
credits.  If  foreigners are able  to credit host  country tax
liabilities  against  their  obligations  to their  own tax authorities,
interest  rates  in the  capital  receiving  country  may not  increase  when
taxes  on interest  income  are imposed.
6/  To  some  extent,  this  issue  of  effectiveness  depends  on the
negotiation of tax treaties that permit tax sparing.  Unless
developed countries allow foreign  tax credits for taxes that are
"spared"  by the host country,  tax incentives  for foreign  firms  may
simply transfer revenues to foreign treasuries.  Tax  sparing,
however,  is not an issue  if the  home country  either  exempts  foreign
source income  from tax or, under a credit system,  firms generally
have  excess  to foreign  tax  credits.
7/  The opportunity  for evading  taxes  may be influenced  by the form in
which the tax  incentive  is provided. Tax holidays,  for  example,  may
be much more susceptible  to transfer  pricing  abuses  than  other  kinds
of tax incentive.
8/  Indexation  measures in a number  of countries  have also helped to
mitigate  the  debt  distortion.- 51  -
9/  In part, the universal  decline  in corporate  tax rates  reflects  the
effects  of international  tax  competition  as  developing  countries  have
responded to the lower rates recently introduced  by a number of
developed countries.  The diminished  availability  of foreign  tax
credits  has also  contributed  to this  phenomenon.
10/  The  presumption  in  this  instance  is  that  lower  tax  rates  will  meke it
worthwhile  for  the  taxpayers  to devote  fewer  resources  to concealing
his true  income  from  the  tax  authorities.  Unfortunately,  none  of the
tax  reform  studies  could  shed  any  empirical  light  on this  issue.
11/  This statement  does  not  apply  to the  traditional  excises  on alcoholic
beverages,  gasoline  and tobacco  products  which have quite  different
rationales  as revenue  instruments.
12/  The  presumptive  income  tax in Colombia  served  a number  of beneficial
purposes.  In  addition  to  curbing  evasion  and  improving
progressivity, it was  a useful instrument for reducing lock-in
effects, taxing imputed income from real estate, and generally
correcting for a number of "timing" problems inherent in the
application of income taxes.  Approximately one  third of all
companies  and individual  taxpayers  were taxed on this basis before
the  tax  was repealed  in 1989.
13/  Here the tax  design  issue  is that of striking  a balance  between  the
desire to tax economic  rents on previous  corporate  investment  and
establishing  an attractive  tax  environment  for  new  investment.
14/  In the case of both Turkey  and Mexico, these taxes  are creditable
against  corporate  tax obligations  so they imply  no extra  burden  for
profitable  companies  that  comply  with the  law.
15/  On the other hand, Colombia unified its VAT rate structure for
administrative  reasons  when the tax was extended  to more retailing
outlets  in 1983.
16/  The collection  of tax  reform  studies  suggest  that it is important  to
avoid blindly adopting  the rules of thumb that often dictate the
calculation  of tax incidence  in developed  countries.  That is, the
incidence  of a tax  must be examined  within  the specific  context  of a
particular  developing  country  and  there  is  no reason  to believe  that
an incidence  rule  that  is  appropriate  in  one  developing  country  would
also be appropriate  in another.  For example,  some indirect  taxes,
such as tariffs that are levied in the presence  of quantitative
restrictions,  may be significantly  more progressive  than any direct
tax.  Moreover,  the rules  of thumb  appropriate  for  a closed  economy
may be  wholly  unsuitable  when applied  to an  open  economy.- 52 -
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